Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.

https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

Xkcd 221: int getRandomNumber() { return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll. guaranteed to be random. }

  • hirihit640@sh.itjust.works
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    4 hours ago

    how clusters decide which members are reliable and which should be deemed faulty.

    I believe you’re talking about RAFT. That requires trusting all nodes, so it’s not any different from how CAs already work. After all, the issue at hand is a compromised CA.

    • non_burglar@lemmy.world
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      4 hours ago

      I believe you’re talking about RAFT. That requires trusting all nodes, so it’s not any different from how CAs already work.

      You lost me, none of that is true.

      After all, the issue at hand is a compromised CA.

      That’s not what happened at all. Read the article.

      • Aatube@lemmy.dbzer0.comOP
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        9 minutes ago

        if the keys are compromised, the CA is considered compromised until it is updated. from a black-box perspective this is not different from the CA’s keys being leaked.