Here’s one such clip:

How do elected delegates to the people’s congresses enable and participate in the mass line? To begin with, many of them are locals, drawn from the masses. Thus, enriching and expanding engagement with the masses means that delegates should not lose touch with their roots. Or rather, they should enhance this background to empathise with the people’s concerns, pool their wisdom, and enhance their well-being. Further, the “line [路线 luxian]” in question has a number of connotations. The word includes two characters, with 路 lu meaning path or road, and 线 xian a thread or string. Thus, 路线 luxian can mean a line on a map or route to follow, an ideological direction, but also a connecting thread. It is a small step to the metaphor of a “bridge” between the Party and the state, a bridge that is constituted by deep “connections with the masses [联系人民群众 lianxi renmin qunzhong].”

8.4.2 Democratic Supervision

A second emphasis of the speech—in relation to the people as masters of the country—concerns democratic supervision. In a socialist system, such supervision or oversight entails a number of substantial components: supervision by the common people through the mass line; the robust practices of consultative democracy; the Communist Party’s substantial practices of criticism and self-criticism; and rigorous rule-of-law procedures. In terms of mass line supervision and the pervasive role of consultative democracy, Zhou Enlai had already pointed out in 1957 that the exercise of state power has the not insignificant risk of becoming divorced from the masses and becoming “dizzy with success.” The best solution: supervision by the masses: “without the people, what can the Communist Party do? … If you do right, the people will support you. If you do wrong, the people will not support you” (Zhou 1957, 348–349). Or as Xi Jinping puts it in the speech under consideration, the inescapable need is for the people to “supervise power [监督权利 jiandu quanli]” and that power should function “in the sunshine [在阳光下 zai yangguang xia]” or transparently (Xi 2022b, 3). However, the main focus in this speech is on how democratic supervision relates to the rule of law. There are two main dimensions: on the one hand, power should be controlled by the “cage of institutions” and driven by the “reins of the rule of law”; on the other hand, oversight power needs to function “in accordance with the law.” The two are obviously related: if supervision is embodied in rule of law, the exercise of supervision must be subject to the rule of law. Thus, oversight is granted to governing bodies by the constitution and the system of laws. This entails that those given such powers must undertake the supervision of the various organs of state power in accordance with the law, but they must also work to ensure that the unity, dignity, and authority of the laws themselves are safeguarded. The best way to do so is to ensure that resolutions, decrees, and laws themselves are implemented in a strict conformity with the law and with transparency.

By now I have moved into the subject matter of the next section, so let me conclude with a personal note. A requirement for foreigners arriving in China is to register with the local public security office. This office is far more than a simple police station. It oversees and supervises all local concerns relating to safety, stability, and harmony. Here residential permits (户口 hukou) for Chinese citizens are managed, as well as those for foreigners. Whenever I need to re-register after being away for a while, I return to the local public security office within 24 hours. In large letters on the wall over the reception desk is a motto, which makes the point that everyone who works in the office adheres strictly to the guidelines, duties, and laws to which they are subject in carrying out their tasks. Why make this point? Perhaps more than any other place in the world, they know that they need both to enforce the laws of the state and to follow the laws as to how they should be enacted—with absolute strictness.

8.5 Comprehensively Governing the Country According to Law

Among the many achievements of the decade since 2012, Xi Jinping has arguably made the greatest contribution to developing and strengthening the rule of law, or governing the country according to the rule of law (依法治国 yifazhiguo). To set the scene, Xi speaks of upholding rule of law in all respects or comprehensively. The items mentioned are indeed comprehensive, speaking of the path followed, the need for construction, ensuring the spirit of a socialist rule of law, of ensuring that all undertakings and work follow the rule of law, and of promoting social fairness, justice, and human rights within a socialist framework. In short, the agenda over the last decade, from 2012, was to “realise a rule of law transformation [法治化 fazhihua] of all work of the state” (Xi 2022b, 2). Since that time, a significant amount of material by Xi Jinping and the CPC Central Committee has been produced, all of it with a resolute focus on seeking to bring about a “rule of law transformation” (Xi 2014a; 2015; 2019; 2021a; 2022a; CPC Central Committee 2014; 2021).9

8.5.1 From Legal System to Rule of Law

In order to understand these developments, some longer historical background is needed (Boer 2021, 209–216). Three terms indicate three periods in the development of rule of law. The first is “legal system [法制 fazhi],” which was found in the preamble to the constitution up until 2018: “improve and perfect the socialist legal system [健全社会主义法制 jianquan shehuizhuyi fazhi].” Given the term’s ancient pedigree,10 it has a fully developed semantic field, with three main senses: its widest meaning refers to all the laws (written and unwritten) of a state and the many political, economic, and cultural components; its more restricted sense designates a legal system and a legal order; and its narrowest meaning refers to the legal system itself (法律制度 falü zhidu). The most common usage understands the term in this narrow sense, with two dimensions. The first is a more static meaning, with reference to the existing laws and regulations of a country; and the second is a dynamic sense, which includes the formulation of legislation, revision, enforcement, and supervision (Xia and Chen 2009, 560). Clearly, “legal system” is rich in meaning and practice in China, and it should be no surprise that this term appeared in the constitution and was emphasised by earlier leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping.

However, in 2018 the constitution was amended and the phrase in question became: “improve and perfect the socialist rule of law [健全社会主义法治 jianquan shehuizhuyi fazhi].” Why the change? Surely the fully-rounded “legal system” was enough. At this point another term becomes important, marking another distinct period: “rule of a person [人治 renzhi].” The period in question is the disruptive decade of the “Cultural Revolution,” during which the “two whatevers [两个凡是 liang ge fanshi]” came to dominate: “we will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.” Proposed by the circles around the Gang of Four soon after Mao’s death,11 the “two whatevers” embody—somewhat paradoxically for communists—a tendency in Confucianism to emphasise that all depends on the will of the virtuous ruler.12 This notion that “a person of virtue rules the country [贤人治国 xianren zhiguo]” came to be known as “rule of a person.”13 As debate developed around the problem after the tumultuous decade, it became clear that a legal system on its own was not sufficient, for it could be used by a small group or a person to advance their own agenda. Indeed, it was during this debate that “legal system” also gained the connotation of “rule by law.”

In this context the third term came to the fore: rule of law (法治 fazhi). Since I have dealt elsewhere with the immense debates of the late 1980s and especially the 1990s (Boer 2021, 212–214), I do not need to repeat that material here, save to point out that the conclusion reached was as follows: a legal system requires a rule of law to prevent the former’s deployment under rule by a person.14 More positively, rule of law provides the framework, goal, and value of the legal system, while the legal system is the concrete embodiment and thus foundation of the rule of law (He and Qi 2018, 11).

Most of this will be less comprehensible if you do not have surrounding knowledge, hence the importance of the whole of the text.