[This article](https://rupeindia.wordpress.com/2020/12/03/peasant-agitation-against-three-acts-not-their-fight-alone/) has a good class-based analysis of the peasant agitation against
the proposed farm bills. I recommend reading it in its entirety but I will copy
paste some portions to provide an overview. At the very least, try to read the last section which is a good overview of how imperialism destroys food sovereignty and security.
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### The threat posed to the peasantry
The immediate aim of the peasant agitation is the scrapping of the three farm
Acts (these bypass the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) mandis
(mandi means trading post), do away with limits on stocking agricultural
commodities, and facilitate contract farming). The Government claims it is
giving peasants the “freedom” to sell their crops anywhere to anyone, they will
not be compelled to go to the mandis. In fact most peasants in India already
have that “freedom”, and as a result they face much worse exploitation. In
direct opposition to the Government’s claim, what peasants want is not this
bogus “freedom”, but the security that their crops will be procured by state
agencies at the Minimum Support Price (MSP). Rice and wheat growing peasants of
certain states, have had such a guarantee. That is now being taken away, under
cover of “liberating‟ peasants from the APMC mandis.
These Acts will lead to a situation where corporate firms will procure crops
from peasants at unregulated prices, hoard stocks, and control agricultural
trade. (Besides, the Electricity Amendment Bill will result in a steep rise in
electricity costs for agriculture, squeezing the peasantry. So the peasant
organisations have demanded that it too be scrapped.)
As the food supply chain comes under greater and greater corporate control, the
working peasantry stand to lose their landholdings in one way or the other.
Since it is cheaper for corporations to deal with a few, large standardised
suppliers than to handle a large number of small suppliers, it will become
increasingly difficult for small peasants in the surplus-producing states to
survive. Small peasants constitute the overwhelming bulk of farmers, even in
Punjab. Already struggling between the scissors of input and output prices, they
may be forced to part with their holdings. (Those who survive may come under
tighter corporate control and supervision over the production process, so that
in effect they hold only the paper rights to the land.) Larger, more mechanised
farms will require a smaller labour force. Thus, while the agitation is
described as a “farmer” agitation, it represents principally the interests of
poor and middle peasants, not all “farmers”.
While those agitating at Delhi are toiling peasants, they may not be the most
downtrodden and impoverished of India‟s peasants. These most downtrodden can be
found in the agriculturally backward regions of our country, and their crops are
never procured by any official agency at the MSP. However, the present peasant
agitation is in the interests of the latter peasants as well. (Because public
procurement at MSP in any region provides a benchmark without which prices in
other regions would fall much more steeply.)
### Depression of wages and aggregate demand
Since the situation of even industrial employment is bleak, the peasants
displaced from agriculture cannot be absorbed in any other sector. India’s
labour force is much too large for emigration to absorb a significant share, and
anyway such opportunities abroad are vanishing fast. So the displaced peasants
will join the reserve army of labour, and this rise in the reserve army will
depress the general level of wages, as desperate labourers compete for scarce
jobs. The process of shrinking employment and depressed wages will depress
aggregate demand, in turn further reducing employment.
### Rendering the country even more vulnerable to imperialist pressure
A country that does not ensure its food security will remain vulnerable to
arm-twisting by imperialist powers. During India’s mid-1960s food crisis, the
cash-strapped country was compelled to import large amounts of wheat as food aid
from the United States (which was trying hard at the time to export its wheat
surpluses). The US used this “aid‟ as a lever to dictate India’s economic and
foreign policy.
In recent years India has faced severe pressure to open up its agricultural
markets. It has been the target of concerted campaigns at the World Trade
Organisation by various exporting countries, who have termed India’s policies
regarding rice, wheat, pulses, cotton and sugar as violative of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The US has been spearheading this drive,
contesting India’s claims that its support to Indian agricultural producers is
in keeping with the AoA. At the Bali conference of the WTO in 2013, India’s food
procurement and public stockholding programme was condemned by developed
countries.
With the support of some other Third World countries, India won a temporary
reprieve, a “peace clause” (in exchange for conceding something else),
suspending any punitive action till a resolution was achieved. However, the
developed countries have been unwilling to resolve this issue, and instead have
kept up the pressure on India to withdraw support to its farmers. At a virtual
WTO meet May 25 this year, at the height of the Covid crisis, food exporting
countries criticised the new aid packages being provided to farmers by some
governments in response to the crisis claiming they would “distort” global food
trade.
Even as India put up a display of opposition at the WTO, the Government’s steps
towards winding up public procurement in essence unilaterally concede the
substance of the dispute – in favour of the developed countries. The developed
countries know well that, once the FCI no longer exists in its present form,
India's seeming self-sufficiency in grain can get eroded quickly. Further,
without the weapon of large physical buffer stocks of foodgrains, the Government
will be powerless to intervene against profiteering private corporations. And so
the crisis of India‟s agriculture and food system in 1965 is still relevant to
India today.
### India in the mirror of Mexico
The above warnings are not speculation or scare-mongering. They are simply
conclusions drawn from observation of the worldwide pattern of the impact of
liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation on agriculture. For example,
this is precisely the model imposed on Mexican agriculture since the 1990s, and
more particularly since 1994 (the North American Free Trade Agreement).
- Mexico’s state trading agency (its equivalent of FCI) was dismantled.
- All state measures to support agricultural production were slowly wound down.
- Subsidies on its staple food (corn) were slowly wound down, and these were
replaced by selective cash transfers to peasants and consumers.
- Imports of US corn (to Mexico, which is the very home of maize and the world‟s
great treasury of maize varieties) tripled.
- Family farms in Mexico collapsed by well over half.
- Total agricultural employment fell sharply, without adequate growth in other
sectors to absorb the displaced peasants.
- Thus unemployment nationwide rose.
- The number under the poverty line rose.
- More than half the population cannot meet basic needs and one-fifth cannot
meet food needs.
- The resulting demand depression caused Mexico‟s GDP growth rates to fall, to
near the bottom for Latin America.
- Emigration rose by nearly 80 per cent as desperate unemployed peasants tried
to enter their northern neighbour.
- The prices of the staple food (tortillas made from corn) rose steeply.
- And the entire market for maize flour is controlled by just two Mexican firms
(Grupo Maseca controls 85 per cent) – a position that Ambani, Adani and Walmart
would like to occupy in India today. (We will provide details of this in a later
blog post.)
This belongs in /c/shitreactionariessay